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I. INTRODUCTION
If you knew that President Donald J. Trump (“President Trump”)
could have pardoned himself after a criminal indictment at the conclusion of
Robert S. Mueller’s (“Mueller”) investigation—in which it could have been
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found that President Trump conspired with Russia to win the 2016
presidential election and he could have obstructed justice by interfering with
Mueller’s investigation into Russian interference—would you still have
voted for him?1 The outright threat to exploit an apparent loophole in our
criminal justice system by President Trump has a plethora of legal scholars
in a frenzy.2 On June 4, 2018, President Trump tweeted from his
@realDonaldTrump Twitter account that he has the absolute right to pardon
himself from any criminal conduct, which was presumably directed to
Mueller and his team.3
According to President Trump, it does not matter if Mueller indicts
him over his alleged involvement in Russia’s meddling into the 2016
presidential election because he can simply use his pardon power on
himself.4 Mueller began an investigation into President Trump and his
alleged collusion with Russia in the meddling into the 2016 presidential
election in which President Trump beat Hillary Clinton for President of the
United States.5
Politics and personal opinions aside, President Trump has a legally
sound argument in using his pardon power on himself.6 United States
1. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 4, 2018, 5:35
AM), http://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1003616210922147841; see also Kaitlyn
Schallhorn, Trump and the Russia Investigation: What to Know, FOX NEWS: POL. (Oct. 10,
2018), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-and-the-russia-investigation-what-to-know.
On April 18, 2019, Mueller’s redacted report was released to the public by the United States
Justice Department on the findings of Mueller’s investigation into Russian interference in the
2016 presidential election. Emily Tillett, Here’s Who Has Been Charged in the Mueller
Probe, CBS NEWS (Apr. 18, 2019, 8:41 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/mueller-report-
who-has-been-charged-in-special-counsel-robert-mueller-russia-probe-2019-04-18/. While
Mueller found connections between the Trump Campaign and Russia, Mueller ultimately
concluded—in the first volume of his report—that the Trump campaign did not conspire or
coordinate with Russia during the 2016 campaign in its election interference activities.
ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE
2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, VOLUME I, 1–2 (2019). In Volume II of his report, Mueller did
not reach a conclusion on whether President Trump obstructed justice in the course of
Mueller’s investigation. ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIALELECTION, VOLUME II, 2 (2019).
2. See Kaitlyn Schallhorn, Can Trump Self-Pardon? Legal Experts Weigh
in, FOX NEWS: POL. (June 4, 2018), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/can-trump-self-pardon-
legal-experts-weigh-in.
3. @realDonaldTrump, supra note 1.
4. See id.; Schallhorn, supra note 2.
5. Schallhorn, supra note 2; see also Schallhorn, supra note 1.
6. See Robert Nida & Rebecca L. Spiro, The President as His Own Judge
and Jury: A Legal Analysis of the Presidential Self-Pardon Power, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 197,
222 (1999); Salvador Rizzo, Can the President Be Indicted or Subpoenaed?, WASH. POST:
FACT CHECKER, (May 22, 2018), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-
checker/wp/2018/05/22/can-the-president-be-indicted-or-subpoenaed/.
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Presidents enjoy plenary pardon power.7 Although no sitting United States
President has ever exercised his pardon power on himself, previous
Presidents have had their legal team research the plausibility behind such
action.8 However, President Trump did not exercise his pardon power on
himself prior to Mueller ending the investigation into his alleged culpability
in the Russian meddling scandal during the 2016 presidential election.9
Legal scholars differ on the Justice Department’s ability to bring
forth a criminal indictment against a sitting President.10 Some
commentators, such as Rudolph Giuliani, argue that President Trump is
immune from criminal prosecution while in office.11 While other
commentators believe no man is above the law—not even President
Trump—and a sitting President is amenable to criminal prosecution.12 Such
legal conflict is a natural byproduct on the lack of guidance from the
Supreme Court of the United States because a sitting President has never
been criminally indicted.13
While foreign powers have indirectly influenced a United States
presidential election,14 Russia’s meddling into the 2016 presidential election
and the extended invitation to find Hilary Clinton’s deleted e-mails by
7. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; Rizzo, supra note 6.
8. Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 199; see also Rizzo, supra note 6. “The
Constitution is silent, however, as to whether the President may grant himself a pardon from
prosecution and, if so, when such a pardon may be issued. In the over 20,000 instances that
Presidents have used this exclusive power, no President has used this power to pardon
himself.” Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 199.
9. See Ashley Parker & Joel Achenbach, Giuliani Defends Trump’s Power,
WASH. POST, June 4, 2018, at A4. Giuliani said, “[President Trump] has no intention of
pardoning himself . . . .” Id.
10. See Schallhorn, supra note 2.
11. Rizzo, supra note 6. “All [Mueller and his team] get to do is write a
report . . . [t]hey can’t indict. At least they acknowledged that to us after some battling.” Id.
12. Norman Eisen & Elizabeth Holtzman, Donald Trump Should Not Assume
He’s Above the Law. A Sitting President Can Be Indicted., USA TODAY, (May 24, 2018, 4:23
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/05/24/donald-trump-not-above-law-
sitting-president-can-indicted-column/634725002/. “Those options, while obviously
unpalatable to the president, are consistent with a basic principle of our democracy: No
person is above the law.” Id.
13. Keith King, Indicting the President: Can a Sitting President Be
Criminally Indicted?, 30 SW. U. L. REV. 417, 422–23 (2001). Former President Richard
Nixon’s (“President Nixon”) assertion that he is criminally immune went unanswered as the
case never reached the Supreme Court. Id. at 422. Executive criminal immunity “has never
been addressed by any court.” Id. at 423.
14. Josh Zeitz, Foreign Governments Have Been Tampering with U.S.
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presidential candidate Trump is unprecedented.15 No sitting President has
faced the accusations President Trump faces today.16 Unfortunately,
President Trump’s conduct on the campaign trail had become the basis of
Mueller’s investigation into his alleged involvement with the Russian
meddling.17
Whether or not a President can use his pardon power on himself has
not been addressed by the Supreme Court.18 The Court has not directly
addressed the amenability of a President to a criminal indictment.19 This
Comment will discuss the constitutionality of President Trump’s suggested
self-pardon ability.20 Further, this Comment will discuss the
constitutionality of indicting the President.21 Lastly, this Comment will
discuss the danger of President Trump using his pardon power on himself.22
II. PRESIDENT TRUMP’SABILITY TO SELF-PARDON
Article II of the United States Constitution is the foundation for the
powers of the executive branch and the President.23 According to Section
Two of Article II, President Trump “shall have Power to grant Reprieves and
Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of
Impeachment.”24
Generally, President Trump enjoys plenary power to grant pardons
and reprieves.25 Although the Supreme Court has never decided the
constitutionality of a presidential self-pardon, the Court has issued decisions
15. Id.
16. See Peter Baker & Juliet Eilperin, Clinton Impeached, WASH. POST, Dec.
20, 1998, at A1; The Impeachment of Andrew Johnson (1868) President of the United States,
U.S. SENATE: ART. & HIST.,
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Impeachment_Johnson.htm
(last visited May 1, 2019).
17. Schallhorn, supra note 1.
18. Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 220.
19. A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution,
24 Op. O.L.C. 222, 260 (2000).
20. See discussion infra Part II.
21. See discussion infra Part III.
22. See discussion infra Part IV.
23. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
24. Id.
25. See Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 221. “[T]he Court has defined the
presidential pardon power as unconditional, except for impeachment.” Id. “The Constitution
does not say what sort of pardon; but the term being generic necessarily includes every species
of pardon . . . .” Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 351 (1866). “To the executive alone is
intrusted the power of pardon; and it is granted without limit.” United States v. Klein, 80 U.S.
128, 147 (1871).
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on the power of a presidential pardon.26 In those decisions, the Court put
few limitations on pardoning, which closely follows the text of the
Constitution and the intent of the Framers (“Framers”).27
While President Trump pardoning himself would be an
unprecedented use of his pardon power, the idea of issuing a self-pardon is
not unprecedented.28 Under the Nixon and Bush administrations, the
Presidents’ legal counsel researched the feasibility of such action.29 Just as
President Trump’s legal team concluded that such ability to pardon himself is
constitutional, former Presidents Nixon and George H. W. Bush’s
(“President Bush”) legal teams reached the same conclusion.30
Although seemingly abusive and unprecedented, President Trump’s
tweet on his ability to self-pardon does have some constitutional support as it
is not expressly prohibited with the only limitation coming in cases of
impeachment.31 Moreover, the Court has not limited the President’s ability
to issue pardons.32 Therefore, President Trump should have the ability to
pardon himself because: (i) the Court has not limited such power, (ii) the
only constitutional limitation on pardoning is in cases of impeachment, and
(iii) Congress lacks constitutional authority to alter President Trump’s ability
to pardon.33
A. Framers’ Drafting of the Presidential Pardon Power
Although bestowing upon the President a plenary pardon power akin
to the King of England seemingly is contradictory to the Framers’ intent of
creating a system of checks and balances, there is evidence that the Framers
intended for such plenary power.34 When taking into account the debates on
the presidential pardon power during the 1787 Constitutional Convention, it
is evident that the Framers intentionally left the only restriction on pardoning
26. See Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 220–21.
27. See id.
28. See id.; Zeitz, supra note 14.
29. Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 212–16.
30. Id.; Schallhorn, supra note 2.
31. Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 217; Schallhorn, supra note 2.
32. See Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 220–21.
33. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 106
(1925); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 147 (1871); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 351
(1866); Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 206–07. The pardon power was adopted with little
limitation similar to the King of England’s power, and the Court thwarted “Congress from
interfering with the discretion of the President to issue pardons.” Nida & Spiro, supra note 6,
at 206.
34. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 516 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C.
Hamilton ed., 1864).
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for cases of impeachment as all other motions failed and none others were
passed.35
During the 1787 Constitutional Convention, various ideas on who
would possess pardon power in the United States government were
debated.36 Although such discussion was not extensive, the pardon power
and its limitations were formed after some debate.37 For example, Roger
Sherman and other Framers believed the pardon power should be given to
the legislative branch, while some others argued that the pardon power
should be bestowed on a combination of the legislative and executive
branches.38 Ultimately, however, the power was given to the executive
branch as some feared the legislative branch would become too powerful
with the ability to create laws and grant reprieves for individuals breaking
those laws.39
Once the pardon power was given to the executive branch, the
discussion on such power revolved around the limitations to pardon.40 Some
advocates argued for a limitation on pardoning an individual only after a
conviction of the crime.41 However, it failed because the majority of the
Framers agreed that “a pardon before conviction might be necessary” in
some instances.42 Others motioned to exclude the President’s pardon power
in cases of treason since the President could secretly hide his involvement
with the crime by pardoning his accomplices.43 However, this motion failed
to garner the majority’s support because the majority believed pardoning to
be a necessity in government and placing limits upon it to be inherently
35. Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 205–06.
36. Id. at 205.
37. Brian C. Kalt, Note, Pardon Me? The Constitutional Case Against
Presidential Self-Pardons, 106 YALE L.J. 779, 786 (1996). “There was little debate on the
pardon power—only a few verbal exchanges and a couple of motions.” Id.
38. Id.; Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 205. “Some advocates, including
Roger Sherman, proposed a plan that placed the pardon power with the Senate . . . [o]ne factor
considered . . . placed the pardon power in a variety of models, including in the legislature, the
executive, or a combination of the two.” Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 205.
39. Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 205–06.
40. Id. “With little further discussion, the power was assigned to the
executive branch, and the discussion then turned to what limitations would be placed in the
provision.” Id. at 205.
41. William F. Duker, The President’s Power to Pardon: A Constitutional
History, 18 WM. &MARY L. REV. 475, 501–02 (1977). Luther Martin motioned to include the
words after conviction in the pardon clause but was persuaded to remove his motion by James
Wilson, as Wilson argued that a pardon could be used to get testimony against accomplices.
Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 502; Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 206; Kalt, supra note 37, at 786.
Edmund Rudolph argued treason should be excluded as the President himself could be guilty.
Kalt, supra note 37, at 786.
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dangerous.44 Ultimately, the only motion passed in amending the President’s
pardon power was the inclusion of “except in cases of impeachment” at the
end of the clause.45
Further, Alexander Hamilton explained such power should resemble
the King of England’s pardon power as it is necessary to justice because it is
an act of mercy by the government on its citizens.46 Hamilton supported this
argument by pointing out that the Governor of New York has more pardon
power because he can pardon in cases of impeachment, yet the President of
the United States cannot.47 If the Governor of New York can have absolute
discretion in pardoning an individual, then why is it that the President should
not enjoy the same power—except in cases of impeachment—as the
President is the leader of a nation of states?48 Clearly, if the Framers
believed the President’s pardon power should have been limited in more
circumstances, then they would have ratified more limitations.49
Therefore, while some Framers believed the President’s pardon
power should not extend to treason cases, a sound argument can be made that
the Framers intended for impeachment to be the only restriction on
pardoning; the majority of the Framers believed the President should have
the ability to pardon in all cases, except those of impeachment, and the only
other limitation argued for was cases involving treason.50
While elements of President Trump’s presidency are exercised in a
manner the Framers could not have envisioned back in 1776, the Framers did
have considerable foresight and implemented constitutional provisions that
have stood the test of time.51 Further, the concept of a self-pardon has not
44. See Duker, supra note 41, at 502; Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 206.
James Iredell argued that we should lean to strengthening our Executive than weakening our
Executive by placing too many limitations on its power. Duker, supra note 41, at 502.
45. See Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 217. “The language that was
ultimately placed in the Constitution prohibited only the pardoning of an impeachment . . . .”
Id. at 206.
46. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 553–54 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C.
Hamilton ed., 1864); see also Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 206, 217–18.
47. THE FEDERALISTNO. 69, supra note 34, at 516 (Alexander Hamilton).
48. Id.
49. Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 217; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 69,
supra note 34, at 516 (Alexander Hamilton).
50. Kalt, supra note 37, at 786–87; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra
note 34, at 516 (Alexander Hamilton).
51. See Constitution of the United States, U.S. SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm. “Written in 1787, ratified in
1788, and in operation since 1789, the United States Constitution is the world’s longest
surviving written charter of government.” Id.; see also Andrew Friedman, Can Constitutional
Drafters See the Future? No, and It’s Time We Stop Pretending They Can, 46 SW. L. REV. 29,
30 (2016); Schallhorn, supra note 2.
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been brought about by an advancement in technology unavailable to the
Framers in the 18th century.52 Thus, the omission on a President’s ability to
self-pardon must carry weight in analyzing the text of the Constitution and
the explicit limitations the Framers placed on the power because, if the
Framers feared Presidents would begin pardoning themselves, then the
Framers would have at the very least debated the issue.53
B. Prior Considerations of Self-Pardon
President Trump’s belief in his ability to self-pardon is not
unprecedented.54 President Nixon and President Bush considered using their
pardoning power on themselves to avoid potential criminal liability for their
actions.55 President Nixon contemplated his ability to self-pardon following
the Watergate scandal.56 Meanwhile, President Bush considered self-
pardoning during the Iran-Contra arms scandal.57
1. President Nixon’s Consideration of Self-Pardon
On June 17, 1972, “[f]ive men [were] arrested after breaking into the
Democratic National Committee headquarters in the Watergate complex in
Washington, D.C.”58 After an investigation into the break-in, President
Nixon’s connection to the crime and subsequent attempt to cover it up
52. Friedman, supra note 51, at 30; Kalt, supra note 37, at 786–87. While
Framers did not directly address a self-pardon concept, the Framers were nonetheless
concerned with the presidential self-dealing in cases of treason, which may involve himself
and his ability to pardon his cohorts. Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 206. Thus, the idea of a
self-pardon has been around since the formation of our Constitution and not brought about by
some technological advancement. Kalt, supra note 37, at 786–87; see also Friedman, supra
note 51, at 30.
53. See Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 206; Kalt, supra note 37, at 790–93.
“While not addressing self-pardons directly,” pardons were nonetheless available to protect
treasonous accomplices. Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 206.
54. Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 212 (noting that President Nixon and
President Bush considered using a self-pardon); see also Kalt, supra note 37, at 799–800
(detailing President Nixon’s and President Bush’s consideration of a self-pardon); Jennifer
Rubin, How Democrats Should Address Trump’s Self-Pardon Claim, WASH. POST: OPINION
(June 5, 2018), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2018/06/05/how-
democrats-should-address-trumps-self-pardon-claim/.
55. Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 212.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Watergate Fast Facts, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/23/us/watergate-fast-facts/index.html (last updated Jan. 14,
2019, 2:29 PM).
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became clear.59 Fearing removal from office and a potential criminal
indictment, President Nixon ordered his legal team to look into his options
out of the scandal and presidency as President Nixon believed he would not
survive impeachment proceedings.60
President Nixon was presented with a handful of options and among
them was the option of a self-pardon.61 In a memorandum authored by
Special Counsel James St. Clair, St. Clair advocated for the legality of
President Nixon’s ability to pardon himself.62 Further, while former
Solicitor General Robert Bork believed a President is immune from criminal
prosecution in office, Bork nonetheless acknowledged “a President could
pardon himself for any acts committed . . . during his term.”63 Such internal
support of President Nixon’s ability to self-pardon led the President to
believe he could exercise his pardon power on himself.64 Ultimately,
President Nixon chose against a self-pardon and resigned only to be
subsequently pardoned by his successor, President Gerald Ford.65
2. President Bush’s Consideration of Self-Pardon
Following President Nixon’s consideration of self-pardon, President
Bush and his legal team considered the same action after the Iran-Contra
scandal became national news.66 In November 1986, an illegal plan to free
hostages held in Lebanon was revealed.67 President Bush and his team
organized a deal to “sell [weapons] to Iran through Israel” in exchange for
freeing United States hostages.68 The proceeds from the sale would then be
used for military action in Nicaragua to combat the rising threat of
59. See id. “June 25–29, 1973 — Dean testifies before the Senate Select
Committee about the White House, and [President] Nixon’s involvement in the Watergate
break-in and cover-up.” Id.
60. Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 212–13.
61. Id. “[President] Nixon also was asked to consider pardoning himself and
resigning or pardoning all Watergate defendants and himself before resigning.” Id.
62. Id. at 212–13.
63. Id. at 213.
64. Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 213. President Ford, Vice President under
President Nixon, explained President Nixon’s consideration and belief that he could self-
pardon was based upon the legal advice given to him from his legal team. Id. President
Nixon’s lawyers concluded a self-pardon was constitutional. King, supra note 13, at 433.
65. Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 213–14.
66. Id. at 214–15; see also Kalt, supra note 37, at 799.
67. Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 214.
68. Id.
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communism in Central America.69 Ultimately, the illegal plan was revealed
and spurred an investigation into the Bush presidency.70
Independent counsel Lawrence Walsh was in charge of investigating
and bringing forth any criminal indictments in connection with the scandal.71
Walsh began turning up the heat on President Bush’s administration by
getting one conviction, three guilty pleas, and two more set to be tried.72
However, as President Bush neared the end of his presidency, with no
possibility of reelection and with a month to go before the trials of the two
indicted were set to begin, President Bush granted pardons to six of his
alleged partners in the scandal.73 President Bush’s pardons reversed the
penalty of the conviction, prevented Walsh from pursuing the rest of
President Bush’s alleged partners, and effectively shut down the
investigation altogether.74 Some believe President Bush effectively issued a
self-pardon by relieving the six alleged partners because it prevented
President Bush from testifying during the trials and shut down Walsh’s
investigation.75 However, President Bush gave his reasoning for the pardons
by stating they were politically motivated to prevent the criminalization of
policy differences in the upcoming trials.76
While President Bush ultimately decided to issue pardons to only his
alleged partners in the scandal, President Bush’s team did consider a self-
pardon.77 Some suggested President Bush’s reasoning in omitting his name
69. Id. at 214 n.123.
70. See id. at 214–15.
71. Id. at 214. “In the midst of the Iran-Contra crisis, Independent Counsel
Lawrence Walsh brought forth grand jury indictments against some of President Bush’s aides,
who were alleged to have contributed to the breaking of laws regarding the scandal.” Nida &
Spiro, supra note 6, at 214.
72. See id. at 215.
73. Id. at 214–15; see also Kalt, supra note 37, at 799; Peter Applebome, Loss
of Democratic Vote Imperils Bush in South, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1992, at A28. While Walsh
claimed the pardons were “an act of friendship or an act of self-protection,” President Bush
explained his reasoning behind pardoning his aides by stating:
The prosecutions of individuals I am pardoning represent what I believe
is a profoundly troubling development in the political and legal climate of our
country: [T]he criminalization of policy differences. These differences should be
addressed in the political arena, without the Damocles sword of criminality hanging
over the heads of some of the combatants. The proper target is the President, not
his subordinates; the proper forum is the voting booth, not the courtroom.
Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 215 (quoting Grant of Executive Clemency, 57 Fed. Reg.
62,145, 62,146 (Dec. 30, 1992)).
74. Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 214–15; Kalt, supra note 37, at 799.
75. Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 214–15.
76. Id. at 215.
77. Id. at 216. President Bush also considered invoking the Twenty-fifth
Amendment to allow Vice President Quayle to pardon President Bush. Id. at 216; see also
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.
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from the six pardons was because of his concern for his image and legacy.78
While President Bush may deny his actions were in effect a self-pardon, his
pardoning of his six partners did constructively issue a self-pardon for his
actions because it stopped Walsh’s investigation into the scandal.79
Moreover, President Bush’s pardons were not challenged or reversed by
either the legislative or judicial branches as being an abuse of a President’s
pardon power.80 Thus, the acquiescence of the government—by choosing
not to pursue President Bush for effectively pardoning himself—could
support the conclusion that a self-pardon is constitutional.81
C. The Supreme Court of the United States and Presidential Pardons
While the Supreme Court of the United States has not specifically
decided the constitutionality behind a self-pardon, the Court has issued
various decisions on the President’s ability to pardon.82 In United States v.
Wilson,83 Chief Justice Marshall defined the presidential pardon power by
stating:
A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power
entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the
individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law
inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though
official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual
78. Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 216.
79. See id. at 214–16.
80. See id.; Kalt, supra note 37, at 799–800. Although President Bush did not
pardon himself, he was still under investigation and could have been indicted following his
exit from office. Kalt, supra note 37, at 799–800. Ultimately, he was not indicted for misuse
of pardon power, nor were the pardons reversed. Id.
81. See Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 200–01; but see Kalt, supra note 37, at
799–800. Kalt argues that President Bush’s pardons were effectively not a self-pardon, but in
effect, President Bush’s pardons shut down the investigation into the scandal. Kalt, supra
note 37, at 799; Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 214. Furthermore, once President Bush left
office months later, Walsh chose not to indict President Bush. Kalt, supra note 37, at 780.
Also, as Kalt recognizes, those pardoned by President Bush could have still been forced to
testify against President Bush, if President Bush was ultimately indicted once out of office,
which could have led to President Bush facing conviction. Id. at 799–800. While Kalt
believes such actions were political and not constitutional, the acquiescence of Walsh and the
government in allowing President Bush to effectively shut down the investigation into his
alleged criminal conduct is a constructive self-pardon as he decided to take sole action that
would prevent Walsh from continuing to investigate his alleged criminal conduct. Id.
82. See Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 121 (1925); United States v. Klein,
80 U.S. 128, 147 (1871); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 351 (1866); United States v. Wilson,
32 U.S. 150, 160–62 (1833).
83. 32 U.S. 150 (1833).
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for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially
to the court.84
The Court went on to explain that pardons may be reviewed by a
court, however, such review is limited and the court cannot judge the
character of the pardon.85 So long as the pardon is executed, delivered, and
accepted properly, the President could argue the pardon is valid as an
executive order.86
About three decades later, in Ex parte Garland,87 the Court again
discussed the President’s ability to pardon.88 The Court issued an opinion
that upheld and reaffirmed a strict textual argument of Section Two of
Article II of the Constitution.89 The Court stated that besides the express
impeachment prohibition on pardons, “the power is unlimited. It extends to
every offence and is intended to relieve the party who may have committed
it.”90 Furthermore, the Court continued its analysis on the President’s pardon
power by stating: “This power of the President is not subject to legislative
control. Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon, nor exclude from
its exercise any class of offenders.”91 This strict interpretation of the
President’s pardon power falls in line with the text of Article II, and the
Framers’ intent to make such power similar to the King of England, whereby
the President may issue it upon anyone for any crime—except cases of
impeachment.92 The decision in Ex parte Garland was upheld in United
States v. Klein,93 as the Court prevented Congress from enacting laws that
would control the President’s pardoning power.94
In Ex parte Grossman,95 the Court discussed what result would
likely occur should a President abuse his pardon power.96 The Court stated
84. Id. at 160–61.
85. Id.; Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 220.
86. Wilson, 32 U.S. at 161.
87. 71 U.S. 333 (1866).
88. Id. at 380.
89. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
90. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. at 373.
91. Id. at 380.
92. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. at 341, 373.
93. 80 U.S. 128 (1871).
94. Id. at 148; Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. at 333. “Now it is clear that the
legislature cannot change the effect of such a pardon any more than the executive can change
a law.” Klein, 80 U.S. at 148.
95. 267 U.S. 87 (1925).
96. See id. at 121.
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that the likely result would be impeachment.97 In Grossman, the Court
opined on the President’s ability to pardon criminal contempt and the
problems that may occur in successive pardoning of a particular offense.98
The Court realized the problems courts may face in carrying out their duties
if the President consistently pardons, but the Court believed that the proper
recourse in addressing the abusive President is not limiting such pardons, but
rather impeachment.99
Thus, President Trump has the ability to make a strong precedential
argument for his ability to pardon himself because the Court has consistently
upheld a strong presidential pardon power.100 The Court has prevented
Congress from interfering with such power and has used strong language that
proves such power is plenary.101 While no self-pardon case has come before
the Court—based upon the historical interpretation of the Court’s analysis of
the President’s power to pardon—the Court has consistently taken a strict
textual position in stating that the only exception to the power is
impeachment.102
III. PRESIDENT TRUMP’SAMENABILITY TO INDICTMENT
Special Counsel Mueller has indicted twelve Russians for allegedly
meddling in the 2016 presidential election,103 and some within the White
House believe Mueller could be targeting President Trump, as well, in
connection with the meddling.104 However, a sitting United States President
has never been indicted before.105 Some legal scholars and commentators
97. Id. at 106. An abuse of the pardon power by the president will likely
result in an impeachment rather than the Court narrowing and restraining the construction of
the general powers of the Constitution. Id. at 121.
98. Id. at 106, 121.
99. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. at 121.
100. See Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 221. While the Court has never
addressed a self-pardon directly, strong precedent leans toward the Court refusing to narrow
the Constitution. Id.
101. See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866).
102. See id.; Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 221.
103. Mark Mazzetti & Katie Benner, 12 Russian Agents Charged in Drive to
Upset ‘16 Vote, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2018, at A1. “The special counsel investigating Russian
interference in the 2016 election issued an indictment of [twelve] Russian intelligence officers
on Friday in the hacking of the Democratic National Committee and the Clinton presidential
campaign.” Id.
104. See Parker & Achenbach, supra note 9; Schallhorn, supra note 1.
105. A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution,
24 Op. O.L.C. at 237 n.14 (citing Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 692 n.14 (1997)).
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believe the President is immune from criminal prosecution while in office.106
Others believe the President is susceptible to a criminal indictment,
regardless of being in office, if the President committed a crime.107
Nonetheless, the Constitution specifically lays out how the President
should be handled if he has committed egregious acts against the United
States.108 Accordingly, pursuant to Section Four of Article II, “[t]he
President . . . shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.”109
While the Constitution does not explicitly prohibit the indictment of
President Trump, there are several commentators that have supported
criminal immunity for President Trump.110 For example, Justice Story came
to the conclusion that a President is immune from criminal prosecution
because a President is unable to be arrested, imprisoned, or detained while he
is President.111 In addition to Justice Story’s belief, the Justice Department’s
Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) has issued two separate reports in 1973
and 2000, respectively, that reach the same conclusion.112 Although no court
has decided the issue, President Trump has strong legal support of his
immunity from prosecution while in office.113
This section will argue why President Trump is criminally immune
while in office—because a proper trial for President Trump is not held inside
106. See id. at 222; King, supra note 13, at 422; Douglas W. Kmiec, Trump
Can’t Be Indicted. Can He Be Subpoenaed?, N.Y. TIMES: OPINION (June 4, 2018),
http://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/04/opinion/trump-lawyers-indicted-subpoena.html.
“Indictment and criminal trial derails a presidency by the compromising stigmas harming
presidential ability to carry out foreign or domestic duties . . . .” Kmiec, supra.
107. See King, supra note 13, at 417–18; Eisen & Holtzman, supra note 12;
Schallhorn, supra note 1.
108. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
109. Id.
110. See id.; King, supra note 13, at 418.
111. King, supra note 13, at 418.
112. A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution,
24 Op. O.L.C. at 222; Memorandum from Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Assistant Att’y Gen., Office
of Legal Counsel, Amenability of the President, Vice President & Other Civil Officers to Fed.
Criminal Prosecution While in Office 1 (Sept. 24, 1973) (on file with Dep’t of Justice).
“[T]he indictment or criminal prosecution of a sitting President would unconstitutionally
undermine the capacity of the executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned
functions.” A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op.
O.L.C. at 222.
113. See A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal
Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. at 260. “No court has addressed this question directly, but the
judicial precedents that bear on the continuing validity of our constitutional analysis are
consistent with both the analytic approach taken and the conclusions reached.” Id.
14
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a courtroom, but rather inside the Senate.114 Further, this section will argue
that a criminal indictment against President Trump while in office would be
unconstitutional because the Framers stated impeachment proceedings
should come before the filing of a criminal indictment.115
A. Who Prosecutes the President?
The prosecution of President Trump while in office is problematic
because a state prosecutor would be unable to arrest the [e]xecutive branch,
and a federal prosecutor would be acting in a manner contrary to the
Constitution.116 While a sitting President has never been indicted, a state
prosecutor would not likely become the first to indict the President as the
Supremacy Clause should prevent such action.117 Further, a federal
prosecutor would not likely become the first to indict the President because
the Constitution specially bestows the power to try the President upon the
legislative branch through impeachment proceedings.118
1. State Prosecution
While President Trump could potentially be indicted by a state
prosecutor for committing a state crime, it is unlikely such indictment would
stand as constitutional.119 According to Article VI Clause 2,120 the
“Constitution and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby”
(“Supremacy Clause”).121 As such, for a state prosecutor to impose state
jurisdiction and attempt to bind President Trump to a state judicial system
would be contrary to the Supremacy Clause because the state would be
acting contrary to the laws in the Constitution by putting state law over
federal law; by doing so, a state prosecutor would essentially be arrest[ing]
the [e]xecutive branch.122
In addition to the apparent contradiction of the Supremacy Clause,
the Court has already decided who should prevail in a dispute between the
114. See King, supra note 13, at 434.
115. See id.
116. Id. at 425.
117. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 436
(1819); King, supra note 13, at 424–25.
118. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
119. See King, supra note 13, at 424–25.
120. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
121. Id.
122. See King, supra note 13, at 425 (quotingMcCulloch, 17 U.S. at 432).
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state and federal government.123 In McCulloch v. Maryland,124 the Court
prevented Maryland from imposing a tax on a federal bank, overturned a
Maryland statute that prevented a bank from operating without state
approval, and held that the statute was a violation of the Supremacy
Clause.125 The Court supported its holding by reasoning that Maryland
burdened the operation of a federal bank, which was to benefit all United
States citizens including the citizens of Maryland, by imposing a tax not just
on its Maryland constituents, but on the rest of the United States population,
as well.126 Thus, Maryland was unconstitutionally interfering with the
operation of the federal government and levying a tax on United States
citizens not within Maryland’s jurisdiction.127
While McCulloch was a dispute over a tax and not a criminal
indictment of a sitting President, the principles of federal supremacy still
carry.128 For a state prosecutor to indict President Trump, that state would
unduly burden and interfere with the federal government that benefits all
United States citizens, not just that respective state’s citizens.129 Further, the
Court expressly stated, “[t]he states have no power, by taxation or otherwise,
to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the
constitutional laws enacted.”130 Thus, if a President is indicted, then the
indictment must come from a federal prosecutor because the Supremacy
Clause prohibits any state from burdening the operations of the federal
government.131
2. Federal Prosecution
Pursuant to Article I, Section Three, “[t]he Senate shall have the sole
[p]ower to try all [i]mpeachments . . . [w]hen the President of the United
States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside.”132 Accordingly, a potential
separation of powers issue could arise if a federal prosecutor indicts a
123. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 435–36.
124. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
125. Id. at 436–37.
126. Id. at 435–36.
127. Id. at 435–37.
128. King, supra note 13, at 425; see also McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 434–35. To
allow a state to prosecute the President while in office would be a direct contradiction of
McCulloch as it would be a single state interfering with the operation of the federal
government, which benefits all states. King, supra note 13, at 425.
129. King, supra note 13, at 425.
130. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 317.
131. See King, supra note 13, at 425.
132. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
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President.133 The Constitution expressly states the Senate shall have the
power to try the President for the alleged misconduct or crime, all while the
Chief Justice presides over the trial.134 For a federal prosecutor to try a
President first—before any trial by the Senate—would be a circumvention of
the express language in the Constitution.135 Further, a federal prosecutor, or
an agent of the executive branch, and a federal judge, or an agent of the
judicial branch, would be acting in place of the legislative branch and the
Chief Justice by trying a President for his alleged misconduct, which is a
direct contradiction of Article I, Section Three.136
B. Presidential Immunity from Indictment
While a separation of powers issue is apparent, OLC concluded
twice—in 1973 and 2000—that it believes it does not have the constitutional
authority to indict its boss, the President of the United States.137 Although
OLC is not a court, nor can it make law through its decisions, the 2000 OLC
report (“Report”) on indicting a sitting President sheds light on the Justice
Department’s interpretation of its ability to indict the President.138 The
Report reaffirms its 1973 conclusion by stating “the Department . . . would
impermissibly undermine the capacity of the executive branch to perform its
constitutionally assigned functions” by indicting a sitting President.139
Although the Report states the Constitution does not expressly
prohibit an indictment and subsequent criminal proceeding to occur while the
President is in office,140 the Report recognizes that the burden placed on the
President to defend himself from criminal prosecution would be so great that
133. King, supra note 13, at 426; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. The
Constitution specifically states the legislative branch has the power to try and impeach the
President. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. A federal prosecutor is under the executive branch;
thus, it would be the executive branch trying the executive branch. King, supra note 13, at
426.
134. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
135. See King, supra note 13, at 427.
136. Id.
137. A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution,
24 Op. O.L.C. at 222.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 223. “The memorandum concluded that the plain terms of the
[Impeachment] Clause [in Article I, Section 3 of the United States Constitution] do not impose
such a general bar to indictment or criminal trial prior to impeachment and therefore do not,
by themselves, preclude the criminal prosecution of a sitting President.” Id.
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it would impair his ability to carry out his constitutional duties.141 The
Report states three burdens that President Trump would face if indicted:
Three types of burdens merit consideration: (a) [T]he
actual imposition of a criminal sentence of incarceration, which
would make it physically impossible for [President Trump] to
carry out his duties; (b) the public stigma and opprobrium
occasioned by the initiation of criminal proceedings, which could
compromise [President Trump’s] ability to fulfill his
constitutionally contemplated leadership role with respect to
foreign and domestic affairs; and (c) the mental and physical
burdens of assisting in the preparation of a defense for the various
stages of the criminal proceedings, which might severely hamper
[President Trump’s] performance of his official duties.142
While the Twenty-fifth Amendment allows for a President to step
away if he cannot discharge his constitutional duties while preparing a
defense to his criminal indictment, the President’s potentially indefinite
absence if he is sentenced to prison for the remainder of his term was not the
intention of the Amendment and is in direct contradiction of the
Constitution’s process for removing the President from office.143 Moreover,
the embarrassment of a criminal indictment would be detrimental to a
President in his role as the chief diplomat with foreign nations.144
Ultimately, the Report balanced the omission of presidential criminal
immunity with the practicality of indicting a sitting President and concluded
that:
[T]he interests in facilitating immediate criminal prosecution of a
sitting President against the interests underlying temporary
immunity from such prosecution, considered in light of alternative
means of securing the rule of law, we adhere to our 1973
determination that the balance of competing interests requires
recognition of a presidential immunity from criminal process.145
141. A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution,
24 Op. O.L.C. at 246.
142. Id.
143. U.S CONST. amend. XXV; A Sitting President’s Amenability to
Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. at 248. “None of the contingencies
discussed by the Framers of the Twenty-fifth Amendment even alluded to the possibility of a
criminal prosecution of a sitting President.” A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment
and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. at 248.
144. See Kmiec, supra note 106.
145. A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution,
24 Op. O.L.C. at 255.
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Moreover, the Report’s conclusion is consistent with former United
States Assistant Attorney General Douglas Kmiec’s analysis of President
Trump’s ability to be indicted.146 Kmiec stated “[i]ndictment and criminal
trial derails a presidency by the compromising stigma’s harming presidential
ability to carry out [his] . . . duties.”147
Thus, should it be found that a President acted criminally on the
campaign trail or otherwise, then the only recourse should be
impeachment—as he should experience criminal immunity for his actions
while in office because initiating a federal prosecution before impeachment
proceedings would be inconsistent with the text of the Constitution and
would greatly impair a President’s ability to carry out his duties.148
C. Impeachment Instead of Indictment
The legislative branch has constitutional authority to preside over
impeachment proceedings, including the President’s impeachment.149
According to Article I, the House of Representatives has the sole power to
impeach and the Senate has the sole power to try all impeachments.150 If the
President is impeached, the Chief Justice of the Court shall preside over the
trial.151 Moreover, Article I states:
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend
further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold
and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United
States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and
subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according
to Law.152
If an investigation concludes the President committed a crime while
on the campaign trail or otherwise, then the proper recourse would first be
the suggestion of impeachment.153 Once impeachment proceedings are
finished, then a President would be susceptible to a criminal indictment—
regardless of whether removal occurs or not.154
146. Id. at 260; see also Kmiec, supra note 106.
147. Kmiec, supra note 106.
148. See A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal
Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. at 260; King, supra note 13, at 434; Kmiec, supra note 106.
149. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
150. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
151. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
152. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
153. See King, supra note 13, at 429; Kmiec, supra note 106.
154. King, supra note 13, at 428.
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1. Constitutional Authority
As discussed in the Presidential Immunity section, President Trump
should enjoy criminal immunity while in office.155 Despite having criminal
immunity, President Trump is nonetheless susceptible to impeachment and
removal should he be found to have committed “Treason, Bribery, . . . other
high crimes, and Misdemeanors.”156 Such immunity falls in line with the
text of the Constitution, and is supported by various commentators, including
the Justice Department.157
Impeachment and removal from office is the proper recourse for an
abusive President.158 The constitutional mechanism for checking an abusive
President, or one that has committed a serious misconduct, is
impeachment.159 To circumvent such a process by filing an indictment prior
to impeachment contradicts the express language of the Constitution.160
Although impeachment proceedings will burden President Trump, similar to
a criminal prosecution, such proceedings are what the Constitution put in
place to check serious misconduct from the President.161 Further, not one
United States President that was impeached had a criminal indictment filed
before impeachment.162 Thus, a strong historical and constitutional argument
can be made by President Trump that it would be unprecedented for a
President to be indicted before undergoing impeachment proceedings.163
155. See supra section III.B.; A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment
and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. at 260.
156. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4; King, supra note 13, at 428–30.
157. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4; Rizzo, supra
note 6.
158. Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 210; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7;
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4;
159. Nida & Spiro, supra note 6, at 210; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7;
Kmiec, supra note 106.
160. See King, supra note 13, at 427.
161. A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution,
24 Op. O.L.C. at 222, 257–58. “[W]e recognize that invoking the impeachment process itself
threatens to encumber a sitting President’s time and energy and to divert his attention from his
public duties. But the impeachment process is explicitly established by the Constitution.” Id.;
see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6–7.
162. Baker & Eilperin, supra note 16; The Impeachment of Andrew Johnson
(1868) President of the United States, supra note 16. Clinton was not indicted prior to
impeachment. Baker & Eilperin, supra note 16. Johnson was not indicted before
impeachment. The Impeachment of Andrew Johnson (1868) President of the United States,
supra note 16.
163. King, supra note 13, at 418, 423.
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a. Prior Presidential Impeachments
Only two United States Presidents—former President Andrew
Johnson (“President Johnson”) and former President Bill Clinton (“President
Clinton”)—have been impeached by the House of Representatives.164
However, both Presidents were acquitted by the Senate.165 President
Johnson was the first impeached President and he was impeached for
violating the Tenure of Office Act after he replaced Secretary of War Edwin
M. Stanton with Thaddeus Stevens.166 President Johnson already had
disputes with Stanton and Senate Republicans during the reconstruction era
and, after replacing Stanton, congressional leaders drafted eleven articles of
impeachment, which included, among others, conspiracy to remove Stanton
from office.167 Although Congress deemed President Johnson’s actions
criminal, he nonetheless finished out his presidency after being acquitted by
the Senate and, most importantly, President Johnson was not indicted for his
alleged criminal conduct before or after impeachment proceedings.168
The second impeached President was President Clinton.169 President
Clinton was impeached for committing perjury before a grand jury and
obstructing justice.170 President Clinton’s crimes stemmed from a sexual
scandal, in which President Clinton lied about having sexual relations with
Monica Lewinsky in front of a grand jury, and obstructed justice in a civil
suit by lying in a separate lawsuit and to Special Investigator Ken Starr.171
Ultimately, President Clinton was acquitted by the Senate after trial, and,
again most importantly, no criminal indictment was introduced after Ken
Starr finished his investigation into President Clinton’s criminal conduct.172
Thus, President Trump had a strong historical argument in opposing
a Mueller indictment while in office, as no previously impeached President
had to face a criminal indictment for the crimes they committed.173 While
the previous impeached Presidents were not alleged to have used a foreign
164. Baker & Eilperin, supra note 16; The Impeachment of Andrew Johnson
(1968) President of the United States, supra note 16.
165. The Impeachment of Andrew Johnson (1868) President of the United




169. Baker & Eilperin, supra note 16.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal
Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. at 237 n.14; Baker & Eilperin, supra note 16.
173. See A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal
Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. at 237 n.14; Baker & Eilperin, supra note 16.
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rival’s power to win the Office, the allegation President Trump faced should
not affect the procedure in place in dealing with a President allegedly
committing high crimes and misdemeanors.174
2. Senate Acquittal and Double Jeopardy
Despite the apparent inability to indict a President while in office, a
President can still feel the effects of an investigation into alleged criminal
conduct by the President through the threat of impeachment—should the
investigation conclude the President committed a crime or serious
misconduct.175 The constitutional mechanism for punishing an elected
official begins with impeachment, then removal from office, then
indictment.176 However, as history has shown, impeachment proceedings are
partisan and Senators are pressured to vote in support of their political
party.177 Thus, despite the serious or criminal misconduct of the President,
he can evade punishment and remain in power if his political party holds the
supermajority of Senate seats.178 Even if President Trump had gotten
impeached and faced a Senate trial, the Republican party controls a majority
of Senate seats which means President Trump could have been acquitted and
remained in office.179
However, even if President Trump got acquitted, he could still be
susceptible to criminal indictment once he relinquishes the Oval Office if
Mueller would have concluded President Trump acted criminally.180 A
Senate acquittal should not bar a criminal indictment once the impeached
174. See A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal
Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. at 237 n.14; Rizzo, supra note 6. “The constitutional mechanism
for addressing serious misconduct (treason or other high crimes) by a sitting president is
impeachment.” Kmiec, supra note 106.
175. Kmiec, supra note 106; Schallhorn, supra note 1.
176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6–7.
177. See Whether a Former President May Be Indicted and Tried for the Same
Offenses for Which He Was Impeached by the House and Acquitted by the Senate, 24 Op.
O.L.C. 110, 133–34 (2000); Baker & Eilperin, supra note 16. The Framers feared
impeachment proceedings could become partisan. Whether a Former President May Be
Indicted and Tried for the Same Offenses for Which He Was Impeached by the House and
Acquitted by the Senate, 24 Op. O.L.C. at 133–34.
178. See Whether a Former President May Be Indicted and Tried for the Same
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President leaves office.181 While no court has addressed the issue directly,
OLC issued a memorandum in 2000 that analyzed the possibility of double
jeopardy attaching to a Senate trial.182 Ultimately, OLC concluded that
double jeopardy should not attach because a Senate trial differs from a
criminal trial.183
According to the Judgment Impeachment Clause, “the Party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial,
Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.”184 The Constitution provides
the possibility for criminal proceedings to subsequently occur if an
impeached official is removed from office.185 However, the clause is silent
on the possibility of criminal indictment for an acquitted official.186 Thus,
President Trump could have made an argument that Senate acquittal bars
subsequent criminal prosecution.187 Such argument falls on the “canon of
statutory construction, expressio unius est exlusio alterius, [or in other
words,] ‘the expression of one is the exclusion of others.’”188 The clause’s
omission of parties acquitted from impeachment could imply a bar on
criminal prosecution of the same offenses.189 Further, when the clause was
originally drafted by the Framers, it was modeled after various states’
impeachment provisions which stated “the party, whether convicted or
acquitted.”190 So, the omission by the Framers to include language which
addressed parties acquitted, and not just impeached, is important.191
Despite the omission of whether convicted or acquitted, double
jeopardy still should not attach to Senate trials, as double jeopardy is
intended to protect individuals from repeated trials for the same offenses that
threaten to take away life and liberty.192 Only taking away an individual’s
elected position, and disqualifying an individual for future elected positions,
181. Id.
182. Id. at 110.
183. Id. at 138, 155.
184. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
185. Id.
186. Id.; Whether a Former President May Be Indicted and Tried for the Same
Offenses for Which He Was Impeached by the House and Acquitted by the Senate, 24 Op.
O.L.C. at 114.
187. See Whether a Former President May Be Indicted and Tried for the Same
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was an American innovation to impeachment.193 In Britain, impeachment
and conviction could result in death.194 The Framers intentionally avoided
such harsh penalties for impeached and convicted officials by only
subjecting such individuals to subsequent criminal prosecution for their
acts.195 Impeachment trials were not designed to result in the taking away of
one’s life or liberty, which would invoke double jeopardy.196
Moreover, the branch of government conducting the trial is an
important distinguishing factor.197 The legislative branch conducts the trial
as opposed to the judicial branch, by design.198 Hamilton addressed this
distinguishing factor by claiming the judicial branch could have two trials of
an impeached official for the same offenses, which is why the Senate
conducts the impeachment trial.199 Additionally, Senators must play the role
of fact finder and interpreter of governing law—hence, judge and jury.200
Lastly, double jeopardy should not attach to Senate acquittal because
impeachment proceedings are susceptible to partisan loyalties which can
affect the Senate’s decisions to convict or acquit.201 As previously discussed,
partisan politics play a decisive role in Senators’ decisions, and going against
the Republican Party or President Trump could prove costly in reelection.202
The Framers also feared impeachments were liable to partisan abuse, to
retain an abusive President, or to remove an unpopular President.203
Therefore, while President Trump should enjoy criminal immunity while in
office, he nonetheless is liable to impeachment proceedings and should not
193. Id. at 126–27.
194. Id. at 120, 126.
195. Id. at 126–27.
196. Id. at 129.
197. See Whether a Former President May Be Indicted and Tried for the Same
Offenses for Which He Was Impeached by the House and Acquitted by the Senate, 24 Op.
O.L.C. at 132.
198. See id.
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200. Id. at 132.
201. See Baker & Eilperin, supra note 16. Impeachment votes fall largely
along party lines. Id.
202. See John Verhovek & Kendall Karson, Sanford Loss Magnifies Trump
Effect on GOP Primaries, ABC NEWS (June 13, 2018, 11:31 AM),
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primaries/story?id=55862833 (discussing recent cases where incumbent Congressmen lost
reelection after opposing President Trump and his policies); Paul Waldman, In Today’s
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2018), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2018/06/25/in-todays-republican-
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be barred from subsequent criminal proceedings if he was found to have
acted criminally—regardless of a Senate acquittal.204
IV. CONCLUSION
Taking a strict textual approach to the construction of the
Constitution, a self-pardon is not prohibited because the President,
historically and intentionally, enjoys plenary pardon power.205 While such
plenary power seemingly is abusive, the Court has done little to limit the
President’s power to pardon individuals.206 The power was designed to be an
act of mercy and similar to the King of England’s power to pardon those
guilty of committing a crime.207 While the actual use of a self-pardon is
unprecedented, the idea of using a self-pardon is not.208 Previous embattled
Presidents reached the conclusion that a self-pardon is not prohibited based
upon the text of the Constitution and the Court’s interpretation of the
power.209 The sole exception to such power is in cases of impeachment.210
Therefore, President Trump’s threat to Mueller to use a self-pardon has legal
support.211 However, such an action would presumably indicate that
President Trump is in fact guilty of colluding with Russia to win the election,
which President Trump adamantly denies.212
Furthermore, the way for Mueller to hold President Trump
responsible for any criminal or serious misconduct is not through use of an
indictment—rather a recommendation of impeachment—because an
indictment should be unconstitutional.213 President Trump should enjoy
criminal immunity while he is in office, not because of partisan beliefs, but
in consideration of the instability a criminal indictment would produce.214
Moreover, the Constitution creates a mechanism for combatting serious or
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criminal misconduct from the President through impeachment and removal
from office.215 Although removing a President from office is unprecedented,
an acquittal from the Senate should not absolve a President from criminal
prosecution once he is out of office.216 Barring criminal prosecution after a
Senate acquittal would be inconsistent with fundamental principles of justice,
and inconsistent with the applied use of double jeopardy because a Senate
trial does not carry the same penalty a criminal trial carries.217
Ultimately, although a self-pardon is not prohibited by the
Constitution, the danger in President Trump pardoning himself is the
seeming abuse of the executive pardon power, which itself could be grounds
for impeachment if President Trump obstructs justice through his self-
pardon.218 Thus, it would be this move by President Trump—rather than the
alleged misconduct Mueller investigated—that could have become the
impeachable and unpardonable offense committed.219
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